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Abstract     
There are no academic studies of incentives schemes for household recycling which 
are successful or useful on large scales in the longer term. For food waste sorting very 
few successful schemes have been reported, with or without incentives. Here the 
authors report findings about a two-year old, 23,000-household scheme in Nanjing, 
China, from an exploratory case study designed to identify key factors using 
observations, measurements, company data and interviews. Results indicate that 
residents were initially motivated by the incentives (e.g. points exchanged for eggs) 
and social influences, but habit was the key factor for maintaining their behaviour, 
and cited as the main reason they would continue if the incentives stopped. 
Interestingly, a perceived improvement in the community site’s cleanliness was also 
cited as an ongoing motivation, and social influences was not mentioned. The 
perceived success of the scheme was confirmed via measurements of participation 
rates (32%), the weight of food waste diverted (0.62 kg per household), and estimates 
of the contamination rate (<1%) and food capture rate (30%) 22 months after start. 
This work identifies key factors for further studies of positive incentives as habit (and 
thus duration), site cleanliness, and variation in ranking with time of social norms. 
 
Key words Incentives schemes, food waste, cleanliness, habit, composting, recycling, 
source separation, social influences 
  
1. Introduction 
11. The problem of residential food waste 
Municipal solid waste (MSW) has become an important issue all over the world. 
The quantity is expected to reach 2.2 billion tons per year by 2025 (Hoornweg and 
Bhada-Tata, 2012) as cities expand and grow. The volume of municipal solid waste 
(MSW) generated in China increased by 5% every year in 2002-2012, reaching 160 
million tons in 2012 (MOHURD, 2012). The problem of MSW is acute in urban areas 
because land is less available for large scale waste processing via landfills or 
incinerators, in urban. Landfilling (91.4%) and incineration (6.4%) are the two main 
waste management techniques in China (Zhang et al., 2010). But food waste makes 
incineration very inefficient as it contains much water (Cheng and Hu, 2010), and 
food waste sent to landfill produces much methane and leachate (Zhang et al., 2010). 
According to a World Bank report in 2012, MSW is composed of 46% food waste 
averaged globally, but China has a high percentage of 64.5% (Zhuang et al., 2008). 
Thus food waste is a global problem in general and for China specifically. 
Diversion of food waste is one approach to this problem, but collecting it suitably is 
difficult. Commercial food waste, and ‘green’ waste from gardens are easier, but food 
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and kitchen waste from households has been challenging, especially in dense urban 
areas. The former can in principle be made into compost: the latter is more suited for 
biogas production. Both processes have proven very difficult to maintain viably with 
such a highly variable waste feedstock. 
 
1.2. Food waste sorting schemes 
Few examples of successful food waste sorting schemes are reported in the 
academic literature, and these are usually for small-scale, short-term and pilot projects 
in sub-urban areas. A capture rate of 2.6% was reported for food waste in the USA, 
based on 2007 EPA data (Levis et al., 2010); Taiwanese programs report a capture rate 
of 9.6% in 2010 after a decade of development (Chang et al., 2013); in Thailand a 
trial scheme over 20 weeks produced a capture rate of 58%, but no longer-term results 
were reported (Boonrod et al., 2015); in Sweden, capture rates of 27% and 28% with 
8.9% contamination levels were reported in one study (Bernstad et al., 2013) and 20-
26% capture rates with 2-8% contamination levels in another. The most successful 
example published seems to be the town of Umea where 55,000 households in single 
and apartment dwellings have had high and stable capture rates, published as 27% in 
2010 (Seadi et al., 2013). Tangential benefits reported include the reduction of total 
waste generation after food waste collections begin (Miliute-Plepiene and Plepys, 
2015). 
Failures of schemes for residential food waste separation are not necessarily 
reported, because civic authorities will usually combine them with other activities. 
However, there are some reports of failure, (e.g. Seadi et al., 2013), and in some 
countries large-scale failures (e.g. Pariatamby and Tanaka, 2013; Dai et al., 2015). 
Many large composting plants tend to fail because of contamination, and high 
operating costs resulting from insufficient waste separation at source (i.e. by 
householders) (Hoornweg and Bhada-Tata). 
Waste sorting clearly requires the involvement of residents, and scores of studies 
have explored different ways to encourage this. Many focus on the effect of different 
types of interventions on recycling behaviour, such as door stepping campaigns (Dai 
et al., 2015; Bernstad et al., 2013), feedback (Timlett and Williams, 2008) or 
awareness raising education (Read et al., 2009). Recently a framework of 13 domains 
of factors to be considered locally in a given intervention has been developed (Xu, 
2016). Other examples are incentives, feedback, rewards and penalties (Steg and 
Vlek, 2009). 
In this paper the authors report on an exploratory case study intending to clarify the 
factors for focus in further studies of incentivised recycling schemes. The case was an 
apparently successful, large-scale, long-term food waste sorting program in a high-
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density urban area. Incentives were given to households via points available daily 
onto electronic ‘green account’ credit cards. First, background information on 
incentive schemes, food waste sorting and motivations for recycling is provided, 
followed by an introduction of the case study and methodology. The findings are then 
discussed in terms of clear lessons and also design factors for any future, large-scale, 
in-depth studies which could be linked to theory or improved practice. 
 
1.3. Background on incentive schemes for recycling 
Various types of incentives schemes have been tried over time with easier 
materials, e.g. with plastic bottles and paper. Although many – successful and 
unsuccessful - are reported in passing in informal talks by government officials, very 
few appear to be rigorously studied or reported. Types range pecuniary incentives for 
individuals or communities, from lotteries with a small chance to win a big prize, to 
large chances of small rewards (Harder and Woodard 2007, Shaw and Maynard 2008). 
Headline results are that they can sometimes be very effective and sometimes not at 
all; they work better when combined with household-level feedback; some 
community-level schemes can be as effective as household ones, and cheaper; the 
monitoring needed to determine who gets rewards can be expensive. Table 1 
summarizes the main points found in the literature.  
Many researchers comment in passing their expectation that positive impacts from 
incentives in recycling may be lost once the incentive ends, but no rigorous study of 
this is known to the authors. Some psychology-based researchers have suggested that 
the use of financial rewards may act as a disincentive for altruistic recyclers (Katzev 
and Pardini, 1987).  
 
Table 1. Headline lessons reported from previous studies of incentives for household 
recycling: strengths and weaknesses of the approach 
Strengths 
Have been shown to be highly effective in increasing participation rates and/or frequency 
and regularity of participation (in a UK study) (Harder and Woodard 2007; Defra, 
2007)). 
Have been shown to be highly effective in increasing participation rates and/or frequency 
and regularity of participation (in a UK study) (Harder and Woodard 2007). 
Have been shown to be particularly effective where baseline recycling rates are low. 
Have been shown to be highly effective in reducing contamination (in a UK study). 
(Maunder, 2006; Timlett and Williams, 2008)  
A UK study found that improvements did not depend on depravation indices of residents. 
(Harder and Woodard 2007). 
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Incentives encourage people to try recycling, discounts or premiums could be used to attract 
first time recyclers.(Dahab et al. 1995) 
Can be tailored to local environment (i.e. schools, flats, rural and urban environments, etc.) 
(Maunder, 2006)  
Rewards are well received by the public and are more politically acceptable than penalties 
(Defra, 2007) 
Can be incorporated into current service infrastructure or local community structure to 
achieve reasonable financial costs 
  
Weaknesses 
1. Incentives appear to be less effective in increasing recycling where rates are already high 
(in a UK study) (Harder and Woodard 2007) only worked up to a certain level (they 
were only effective at increasing participation from a low baseline) and need to be of 
significant value to the householder. (Woodard et al., 2006) 
2. Incentives require an effective service delivery and communication in order to be 
effective themselves (Maunder, 2006; AEAT, 2006) 
Incentives can be expensive to deliver, averaging £5 per household in the target area. 
(Maunder, 2006), or very cost-effective (Harder 2007): careful design is needed. 
4. Reward schemes are often complex and it is difficult to isolate the effectiveness of the 
constituent parts. (This study mixed door stepping with rewards.) (Timlett and Williams, 
2008) 
5. There is almost no reported research into the sustainment of any increases in recycling 
once rewards are removed. (Timlett and Williams, 2008) 
6. It is hypothesized that incentives could lead to people starting to recycle but then return to 
previous habits (Vining and Ebreo. 1990) 
7. Some psychology- based researchers have suggested that the use of financial rewards 
may act as a disincentive for altruistic recyclers. (Katzev and Pardini, 1987) 
 
1.4. Background to key elements of food waste sorting schemes 
The separation of food (or ‘kitchen’) waste from other waste by householders is a 
relatively new activity in non-rural living worldwide. Only in recent years have the 
first few rigorous studies of food waste sorting schemes been published, laying out the 
key elements. Bernstad et al. (2012) reported on the value of face-to-face versus 
written provision of information, and later researched the importance of convenience 
(Bernstad 2014). Very recently, Xu et al. (2016) researched a large, successful, 
residential food waste sorting (recycling) program in urban high-density housing to 
elicit perceptions of the key elements of its success from various stakeholders, which 
were found to relate to clarification of roles and responsibilities, and the usefulness of 
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a ‘broker’ (an NGO (non-governmental organization)) to co-develop new boundaries 
for stakeholder responsibilities, and the involvement of volunteers. Lin et al. (2016) 
found that brightly coloured bin covers seemed to improve food waste diversion 
results through prompting and affect, but confirmed that personal modelling of the 
activity daily at communal bins was more effective.     
The use of incentives as a strategy is an expensive undertaking, but this is 
compounded by the additional funds required for monitoring required to determine 
which participants deserve the rewards (Maunder, 2006; AEAT, 2006). Most reported 
schemes did not last beyond a year (Table 1). However, the Recycle Bank scheme in 
the USA (RecycleBank, 2016) and Nanjing’s Green Points incentive scheme are both 
smart systems using ‘credit cards’ where participating residents gain points by 
depositing waste, and then exchanging them for goods or services. These schemes 
embed a monitoring and evaluation system, and as their use extends over time, could 
provide opportunities for the much-needed studies on long-term effects and durability 
of incentives schemes, including variations against demographic parameters. 
  
1.5. Motivating factors in recycling 
Incentive schemes contain complex elements, and it is difficult to isolate the 
effectiveness of the constituent parts. An analysis of the recycling behaviours of 
residents does not immediately reveal the aspects of the scheme that elicited each 
behavioural type.  For instance, determining how much of these effects were due to 
the introduction of the scheme(s) and associated infrastructure, the financial reward, 
communications, feedback or local outreach workers) (Timlett and Williams, 2008).  
A UK study showed that recycling attitude is a major determinant of recycling 
behaviour and that the attitudes are influenced, firstly, by appropriate opportunities, 
facilities and knowledge to recycle, and secondly, by not being deterred by 
operational issues of physically recycling (e.g. time, space and convenience) (Tonglet 
et al., 2004). However, other studies show that a positive attitude towards recycling 
identified through questionnaires and interviews does not necessarily relate to actual 
levels of recycling. Candidate motives for participation need to be explicitly assessed 
in recycling programs, e.g. financial incentives versus environmental concern or 
social norms (Dahlen and Lagerkvist, 2010; Timlett and Williams, 2008). 
Hage et al (2009) indicated that both economic and moral motives influence 
household recycling rates in Sweden, but the latter much less. Gonnerman et al. 
(2000) found that more than half of residents (51.7%) return empty containers to 
shops or deposit centres to claim the deposits on them. This behaviour corresponds to 
the classic rational actor theory of economics, which suggest actions are driven by net 
gain. 
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Social norms can also play significant roles in motivation. Schultz et al. (2002) 
refer to several studies, concluding that there is a positive correlation between 
recycling and respondents’ beliefs about the activities of others. High participation 
rates can also encourage more residents to join in recycling (Tucker, 1999). Barr et al., 
(2003), stress that social norms are particularly important factors in places where 
visibility of recycling behaviour is high.  
Habit has been proposed as a significant factor in recycling literature. Knussen and 
Yule (2008) found that lack of recycling habit contributed significantly to the variance 
of intention to recycle, and moderated the attitude-intention relationship. Ittiravivongs 
(2012) researched the impact of habit on household waste recycling behaviour in 
Thailand with personal interviews, and found that habit was the second largest factor, 
after recycling intention.  
Most recycling behaviour motivation studies have focused on recycling waste 
generally, not food waste in particular. Separately, there is paucity of information on 
motivation of financial incentives for household recycling. Thirdly, no studies explore 
factors leading to long-lived effects (durability). The work reported in this paper aims 
to contribute to these three gaps in knowledge by exploring a case of a successful, 
long-lived food waste incentives program. The findings will be used to design a more 
focused and deeper descriptive case study to follow, which should itself reveal key 
factors to consider in the field and in theory building.  
 
2. Back ground  
2.1 Waste management in Nanjing 
In 2013 the Nanjing Municipal Government launched a demonstration waste 
sorting program known as the Nanjing Green Account scheme, in which residents 
gain electronic points if they sort their food waste into designated containers separate 
to other waste. (‘Dry’ recycling such as plastic bottles, card and paper have a sell-on 
value and are not common in the waste.) Points are later exchanged for goods or 
services. City wards entered into a business agreement with Company A in a Public-
Private Partnership, at roughly 20 RMB ($2) per household per year. As shown in 
Figure 1, Company A is then responsible for publicity of the scheme, food waste 
collection, sorting operations on site, and transportation to further processing sites. 
Company A must cooperate with lowest level of the government - the Community 
Committee. In China households are in informally arranged compounds of 300-
20,000 households, fenced and gated and with communal gardens and waste facilities, 
and each is allocated to a Community Committee which often as an office based on 
site. There were twenty-three communities (twenty thousand households in total), in 
Nanjing’s pilot scheme, of which 6,000 households presently participate in the Green 
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Account scheme at a frequency level of sorting their food waste for 20 days or more 
each month.  
 
Figure 1: Schematic diagram of the main stakeholders in the Nanjing incentives food waste 
sorting scheme. 
 
 
2.4. The Exploratory Case: “Community Fifteen”  
Ward B is located in a suburb of Nanjing. Most of its communities are re-settlement 
residential areas, i.e. the residents have been moved there en masse from previous 
settlements in urbanization programs. Our case, which we denote Community Fifteen 
(C15), is typical of resettlement communities in Nanjing, and Table 3 shows its social 
demographics. Note that more than half the population are older than fifty and most 
(60.5%) have low education (ending at primary or junior high school).  
 
Table 2. Social demographics of Community Fifteen 
Total Households 1296 
Number of buildings (Style) 36 (6 floors high) 
Age of residents Number 
0-19 372 
20-49 617 
50-59 430 
>60 613 
Male: Female 34:43 
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Education of residents Number 
Primary School 419 
Junior High School 930 
High School 673 
College Degree or above 249 
Total residents 2271 
Housing Price( RMB m-2)  13000-15000 
  
 
 
3. Methods 
For the research objective of identifying key factors in the success of the scheme, a 
grounded approach was chosen within an exploratory case study methodology. 
Grounded theory implies that the researcher goes into the field without preconceived 
ideas about what the findings should be (Babbie, 2010): a grounded approach is 
slightly different in that it allows pre-considered candidate concepts to be brought into 
the data collection phase as background material to raise receptivity, without using 
them to construct rigid framing for the data. Thus, for example in interviews, open 
questions were used first to elicit local responses without bias, and then followed by 
closed questions to check for presence or not of candidate concepts. Similarly, 
observations were focused on discovering key themes first, and then checking for 
presence or not of candidate concepts. Data collection included walk-through surveys, 
non-participant observations of the related activities and community activities in the 
public areas, notes on the relevant facilities available, and then interviews of 
residents, community committee members and company staff both in the field and 
central office. The company also provided data on participation rate and tonnages of 
waste collected, and various sources provided basic demographic data and historic 
waste data. 
This particular community was chosen from the twenty-three available because it 
had been running long enough to establish the scheme’s success, yet had no atypical 
demographic characteristics, and had stakeholders who were indifferent to the study 
taking place. The boundary of this exploratory case study is the residential community 
and the directly involved stakeholders of that community including the residents, 
Company A, and the Community Committee, within the 22-month period of the 
scheme. The following specific methods were carried out to obtain a range of data 
collection opportunities. 
 
3.1. Observation and notes about the Green Account scheme in the field  
Non-participant observations were employed in May and June, 2015. The 
observers stood near the daily food waste sorting facility to watch the workers’ and 
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residents’ behaviours. Secondly, the ‘hardware’ of the food waste sorting schemes was 
noted, including waste bins, scales and cards readers. Thirdly, semi-structured 
interviews were used to initiate general information from the workers and residents 
(given in Supplementary Materials), and finally, observation was used to note the 
monthly egg exchange activities, and more generally the workers’ and residents’ 
general behaviours on site. 
 
3.2. Quantitative measures of behaviour 
Some parameters were identified for measurement as a means of ascertaining the 
success level of the scheme. These were participation rates, weights of waste and 
contamination of the food waste bins, described below.  
 
3.2.1. Participation rate 
Self-reported participation rates are used by some researchers (Gamba and 
Oskamp, 1994; Thomas, 2001), but others criticize their validity for practical planning 
due to documented inconsistency with actual behaviour (Perrin and Barton, 2001; 
Williams and Kelly, 2003). In the Nanjing model, every household can register one 
smart card and receive one point each day they empty their sorted waste into a 
designated bin, manned 6.30-9.30 am. The participation rate (RAU), measured in 
family units participating per month (at least 20 days), was thus chosen: 
U
AU
AH
NR
N
=  
NU: Number of participants in Community (defined as participating at least 20 days 
per month) 
NAH: Number of all the households in Community 
 
3 2.2 Capture Rate  
In this study the waste category of interest was household food waste and the 
extent to which it was sorted by residents from the general residual waste into the 
special bin for food waste. A suitable indicator for this is the Capture Rate (WRAP, 
2010), also denoted ‘Source Sorting Ratio’ (Dahlen and Lagerkvist, 2008), calculated 
as: 
FWCR = FW*100/Total FW 
Where Total FW = (Ratio of food waste in All waste) * All waste 
and FW denotes food waste (with any contamination removed). 
 
3.2.3 Contamination Level 
 The contamination levels were monitored regularly by the company staff, and 
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reported in terms of the proportion of deposits contaminated against those which were 
not. Although the only contamination was usually the bag left on the waste, of 
negligible weight, the maximum contamination level was recorded e.g. 1 bag in 100 
deemed 1% contamination. 
 
3.3. Interviews of different stakeholders 
In-depth semi-structured interviews were used with the boss and workers of 
Company A, the leader of the Community Committee, regarding details of the scheme 
operation, interactions between stakeholders, challenges, and overview of any 
relevant data available e.g. demographics or derived from cards. A structured 
interview with a convenience sample of 35 participating residents, identified after 
depositing their waste, focused on communications, suitability of scheme to local 
context, opinions of the scheme, and motivation and challenges faced to initiate and 
continue participation. A further convenience sample of 19 non-participants were 
interviewed, identified by the Community Committee. This approach was deemed 
appropriate for a non-descriptive, exploratory study. All three questionnaires are given 
in full in the Supplementary Materials.  
 
4. Findings 
4.1. Observations and enquiries of the Green Account scheme 
Traditional black bins for normal waste were located at the outside of each 
building. The sorted food waste had to be deposited at a specific time and place in 
order to obtain Green Points: 6:30 - 9:30 am in a central area, like a square, which is 
near the main gate. Many residents arrived early and have conversations with each 
other while lining up. When the company staff arrived, each person placed their bag 
of food waste on a portable scale for recording, and received one Green Point on their 
electronic smart card. The same staff regularly came, and knew the residents 
individually, and relaxed and friendly exchanges between them were the norm. 
There were two types of waste bins observed: several green ones for the food waste 
and one yellow one for the empty plastic bags. Residents open their bags, empty out 
the food waste, and then place the bag in the yellow waste bin. On visual inspection 
there was no contamination of the food waste at all. A company staff member checked 
now and again, and if necessary removed a plastic bag from it – typically 2 per 200 
participants daily. They also used a rag and water to clean all the food waste bins 
several times each morning. There were dedicated trucks for the collection and 
transportation of the food waste, noticeably different to those for the non-food waste.   
Near the bins was a very large poster, showing the weight of food waste sorted in 
the previous month, and the number of green points awarded for each apartment 
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number. The best households were denoted with red text. A group of middle-aged 
women exercise in the nearby square by slow line-dancing (a common activity in 
China) after they have completed their food waste sorting. The square is close to the 
common residential recreational centre where such activities often take place. To the 
researchers, the waste sorting activity did not stand out as an activity separate to other 
community activities taking place. 
Once a month, the residents exchange Green Points for eggs, dish washing 
detergent, or services like sharpening knives or repairing insect screens for windows. 
Three Green Points can be exchanged for one egg, with a maximum of ten eggs per 
month if they do the sorting every day. The residents queue to exchange their points 
for the eggs. While queuing, they talk a lot with each other, including about how 
many eggs each is getting: we heard that some residents really care about the number 
of eggs they get, and some who do not sort waste are interested to get eggs. 
Company records showed that 32% of the residents participated more than 20 days 
in March, 2015. Twenty-six of the 32% did not miss any days. Contamination levels 
were reported at consistently less than 1%. Data also showed an average of 453 kg 
day-1 of food waste collected that month, which scales up to 166,000 kg annually. We 
can gain a rough measure of the Capture Rate FWCR at 30%, by using government 
data showing 2271 residents produced 359 kg per person of total (mixed) waste in 
2014 (Nanjing MSW pollution control information notice, 2014), giving a total of 
815,062 kg, and published data from elsewhere on Nanjing’s average food waste ratio 
of 70.2% (Tai et al., 2011). 
Interviews from Company A revealed that the main motivation of the company is 
economic benefit: government payment in exchange for meeting threshold 
participation rates. The company is also interested in obtaining longer-term and 
further contracts, and thus is willing to reflect on any improvements needed. 
The company considers the residents to have low awareness of or inclination to sort 
food waste, and thus that incentives are needed to start and to continue. They consider 
that eggs are used daily by many and in demand: thus they are a good choice for the 
scheme, especially for low income residents. They have a unit focusing on scheme 
promotion, distributing leaflets to residents and occasionally organizing extra events 
including door-stepping for low performers for further information and persuasion.  
The staff feel they provide good services to residents, reliably attending even 
during bad weather. They feel their incentives and services, including infrastructure, 
are more useful to the residents than straightforward information and indirect 
education which are common elsewhere. 
 
4.2. Perspectives of the Community Committee 
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The Community Committee (CC) was instructed to implement a waste sorting 
scheme by its ward office, but already had an overlap of interest. There were 
previously problems from waste in the community, such as bad smells from the waste 
bins, waste left on the ground and leaking, and flies nearby. This situation caused 
residents to prefer the waste station to be moved away from them, and for related 
conflicts to arise. The ward office wanted to start the sorting, but they had no 
experience. They did not know how to make residents understand the benefits, nor 
have manpower to allocate.  
After the Green Account scheme was implemented, the CC perceived that the 
community became cleaner, that bad smells and leachates had abated, and the number 
of flies reduced. There were no conflicts between residents about the siting of the 
waste bins. At the start of the scheme the Community Committee informed residents 
through standard means –posters, blackboards and fliers in mail boxes – and got 
actively involved with teething problems.  
 
4.3. Responses from participants on motivation factors 
A non-representative, convenience sample of 35 participating residents were 
interviewed to explore motivation factors for starting and continuing to sort their food 
waste. Most of them (26/35) were older women with a low education level. They all 
thought the eggs were the best of the rewards, and ten eggs per month was reasonable.  
When asked if they were likely to continue or not if the incentives were stopped, 
most of the residents (26/35) said they would continue, and only a few (5/35) that they 
would stop. The others said it depended on how much time they had, relative to the 
manned hours. Those who said they would likely continue, were asked why. Three 
reasons were given: that waste sorting had become a habit by this time (15/26), that 
waste sorting would keep the community clean (5/26) and that waste sorting is good 
for future generations and the environment (4/26) (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Responses of participants to the question: What is the reason you say you would 
continue to sort food waste even if the Green Points scheme stopped? Note that the numbers 
are only indicative as a non-representative convenience sample was used.  
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When asked what motivated them to initially begin to sort food waste, the two main 
responses from the convenience sample were that the eggs incentive is the main 
motivation (15/35); because their friends, families and neighbours were doing it, 
(8/35) (see Table 3).
2 
4 
5 
15 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
No reason and the waste still need throw
It's good for environment and next
generation
Waste sorting can make the community clean
 It is the habit now
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Table 3. Responses of participants to the open question: What motivated you to initially start 
sorting your food waste? Note that the numbers are only indicative as this is a qualitative study 
and a non-representative convenience sample was used. 
Result of interview Number of residents (Percentage) 
Because of the eggs incentive 15 
Because my friends, families and neighbours do it 8  
Don’t know, or didn’t answer this question 5  
My mother makes me do it 1  
I feel the waste sorting is a fresh/new thing 1  
It makes the community clean 2  
The waste bins are clean and pleasant 1  
The leaders (community committee) expect it 2  
 
When asked why they continue to do the food waste sorting, the main answers were 
that it is now a habit (15/35), it makes the community clean (8/35), and only thirdly, for 
the eggs incentive (7/35) (see Figure 3). Comparing this to the initial motivations, in 
Table 3, the eggs incentive greatly decreased to seven residents, and habit was a 
dominant response. This is consistent with responses to the question about whether they 
would continue if the scheme stopped (Figure 2), and altogether implies that although 
the eggs incentives got people started, habit dominated later. Secondly, the motivation 
of a cleaner community appeared to increase, implying that such a perception was 
significant to the residents. 
  
Figure 3. Responses of participants to the open question: What motivates you to continue to sort 
your food waste? (Note that the numbers are only indicative as this is a qualitative study and a 
non-representative convenience sample was used.) 
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4.4 Responses from non-participants on barriers to participating 
Eighteen residents (male: female 4:15) who did not participate were asked what the 
biggest challenge was for them, and then what they company could do to motivate them 
more, as open questions. Thirteen cited inconvenience (waste station was too far or 
manned at inconvenient times): five did not believe the scheme had meaning (food 
would be mixed back; landfilled; could not be successful). Changes that could influence 
them were cited as change of manned hours and/or distance (10); if other residents did a 
better job (3); others (5). 
 
5. Discussion 
Thirty-two percent (32%) of the residents did food waste sorting at least 20 days per 
month, and roughly 30% of the food waste was diverted for recycling, with 
contamination at <1%. This capture rate is higher than obtained in Taiwan (Chang et al., 
2013), USA (Levis et al., 2010) and Sweden’s food waste sorting schemes (Bernstad et 
al., 2013; Bernstad, 2014; www.umeva.se) and with a lower contamination level. This 
incentive scheme has lasted for 22 months with stable participation rates and tonnages 
of diverted food waste - longer than all the incentive schemes found in our literature 
review. Thus the authors conclude that this case is a successful incentive food waste 
sorting scheme. 
1 
1 
3 
7 
8 
15 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
All of us can get the benefits
My mother let me do
It's good for environment and next generation
Because of the eggs
It make the community clean.
It is habit now
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The main stakeholders were found to be the residents, community committee, ward 
government office, and the company. The ward office was the driver of the policy 
implementation and provided funds for it, but did not provide guidance on who should 
take what roles other than that the community committee must show compliance 
eventually. The community committee thus was under pressure to implement waste 
sorting, but did not have enough experience, time, or manpower; the company had 
experience and manpower and desired business growth. Although the government in 
China plays a dominant role in organising collecting, sorting, transporting and treating 
of waste (Huang et al., 2014), almost no successful food waste schemes have been 
reported, possibly because most rely on an information strategy alone such as the 
provision of mail shots, banners and posters (Dai et al., 2016).  
Besides this lack of expertise, the interviews of residents and the community 
committee showed that the government is not perceived as consistent or persistent in 
implementing its waste sorting policies, but rather as tending to discontinue a scheme if 
it does not yield expected results quickly. This negatively affects the waste sorting 
enthusiasm of residents and reduces their willingness to participate: they believe the 
programs are only tokenistic. Building community trust has been noted in some grey 
literature as an important component of some community-based behaviour change 
approaches: Bradford Environmental Action Trust first assisted a local community to 
carry out environmental clean-ups to improve appearances before their main 
intervention to increase participation in recycling (Brook Lyndhurst & Waste Watch, 
2007). 
The need to recruit specialist expertise and brokers has been commented on 
previously (Brook Lyndhurst & Waste Watch, 2007). In Europe and North America 
private enterprises and non-profit organizations have taken on roles as owners and/or 
operators of successful residential source separation programs, bringing in specialist 
knowledge to develop the recycling strategies and plans, and to broker between the 
government and communities (McDougall et al., 2001). Xu et al (2016) reported the 
usefulness of a government-approved NGO broker in Shanghai which helped to co-
develop new boundaries for stakeholder responsibilities to produce a large, successful, 
residential food waste sorting program in urban high-density housing area. In this study, 
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the company managing the incentives scheme and related infrastructures appears to 
have provided an important brokerage role between the government and residents. The 
resulting partnership appears to have worked because the company was able and willing 
to fill in various missing roles as needed, making efforts to respond to residents’ 
sensitivities such as choices of incentives, bin cleanliness, and interest in social 
interaction. (It should be noted that the facilities to process any food waste were the 
responsibility of entirely different parties, also with complex role boundaries, but these 
were already established and not found to be relevant in this case study.) 
 
Interestingly, our interviews revealed that the government and company had no 
confidence that residents would sort food waste without ‘something in return’, and were 
thus very comfortable with the concept of an incentives scheme. Our results confirmed 
that this was the highest cited reason for starting to participate in this community. 
However, the results also revealed social influences as important (Table 3) and we know 
from studies in Shanghai that non-incentivised schemes involving the use of volunteers 
also worked because of social influence (Xu et al., 2016: Dai et al., 2016). This then 
raises an interesting question for policy and implementation: is there any way to 
discover what proportions and type of residents are motivated to begin a new behaviour 
via incentives versus social influences, and can this be made predictive. 
Concerning the question of what motivates continued participation after 22 months, 
our exploratory findings revealed that the incentives were not key (Figure 3). This is 
counter-intuitive to the policy makers in China, who model the residents as ‘rational 
actors’ in the economics sense of requiring tangible benefit for extra effort. But the 
residents said the habit is embedded now, and is not only their main reason to continue 
but also why they suggest they might continue if the incentives were removed (Figure 
2). Habit of recycling has been noted to be a significant factor in various studies, but 
usually psychology-based rather than operational waste management. The residents in 
this case study typically sorted their waste almost every day, for 22 months: a repetition 
of hundreds. The authors suggest that higher levels of recycling habit would probably 
reduce the impact of other, intention-based factors such as social influence, personal 
preference, and expectation of the consequences. Further field studies separating and 
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quantifying these factors to make them useful in predictions and planning would be 
valuable. 
 
The second reason given for continuing to sort waste is very interesting and also 
counter-intuitive: residents feel their environment would be cleaner. In fact, none of the 
contracted or related activities targeted community cleanliness, and the researchers 
could not ascertain any clear indication of any such change. It thus seems debatable as 
to whether this extra cleanliness is real or perceived: it could be more related to 
emotion, which is a factor in some behaviour change frameworks. The residents in this 
study certainly made many passing comments on their dislike of dealing with the 
‘dirtiness’ of waste, which is consistent with that idea. We found no studies specifically 
examining site cleanliness with respect to recycling, but after a thorough search it two 
minor mentions were found. In a study of factors influencing waste separation among 
householders in Uganda, commitment to a clean environment was the main motivation 
(45%) reported for waste separation (Ekere et al., 2009). And when asked about wider 
benefits of recycling in the UK, some residents commented that they had noticed an 
improvement in street cleanliness (Phillips et al., 2011). Although our own research 
group has heard ‘cleanliness’ occasionally reported informally or anecdotally in several 
previous studies in the UK and China, it was always ignored because those studies used 
waste management frames, and emotion or perceptions were not included. This case 
study shows that cleanliness clearly deserves more investigation: it might be an 
important factor in the field regardless of its lack of connection to current waste 
management models. 
The main reasons given for non-participation, and for company changes, were related 
to inconvenience – of the manned hours, and the distance. A further few mentioned no 
belief in the program’s success. Such answers might truly represent reasons, or might be 
excuses made up at the time of the interview: it is very difficult to tell from an 
interview. However, these particular inconveniences can be specifically tested in further 
studies.  
 
6. Conclusion 
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This study shows that Nanjing Green Account is a successful incentives scheme for 
food waste sorting and has lasted longer than most documented before it. The high 
capture rate (30%), extremely low contamination level (1%) support this claim. 
The main stakeholders all identified barriers between them that hindered 
implementation, such as low belief of serious intent or capability in each other to 
achieve success; of lack of appropriate expertise and pathways forward; of low concern 
for the principle of sorting food waste; and of uncertainty in how to motivate the 
residents. The use of a company as a broker between government agencies and the 
residents seemed to successfully resolve those concerns, and the authors feel its 
flexibility and willingness to reflect on local sensitivities was key.  
This exploratory case study found evidence that even though the scheme was 
incentives-based, social influences were significant, and should not be overlooked in 
future planning. Habit became a significant reason to continue participating, possibly 
overtaking social norms and the incentives themselves, and may allow incentives to be 
removed or reduced. These factors have the potential to significantly affect the success, 
viability and practicality of future recycling schemes and should be studied further, and 
over time. Some of the principles are general and thus findings might be transferable to 
other behaviours.  
A new factor of perceived site cleanliness was found to be important in this study. It 
is interesting both in operational terms where it could be easily implemented to improve 
or drive success in recycling, and in behaviour change studies to understand its 
psychological origin and relationship to other determinants. Similarly, specifically 
mentioned inconveniences of distance and manned hours of the waste station should be 
investigated further, and if possible relative to the other factors. 
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